b'memberdesignatedandtrainedto3. City Cruises U.S. implement a safety(Supersedes Safety Recommendation execute City Cruises U.S.s emergencymanagement system, or SMS, for itsM-05-006) response plan for a fire aboard a ves- fleet. Procedures for handling open-selto remain aboard the vessel untilflame devices and requirements forLESSONS LEARNEDallhospitalitystaffandothernon- crewmembers to be on board wouldUsing open-flame devices, like chaf-crew personnel departed the vessel. typically be included in an SMS. ing fuel heating canisters, on a vessel poses a fire risk because the devices NTSB RECOMMENDATIONS 4.PassengerVesselAssociationshareopen flames can ignite combustible Asaresultoftheinvestigation,thewith its members the circumstanc- materials.Improperlyextinguishing NTSBissuedfournewsafetyrecom- es of the M/V Spirit of Boston fire,or disposing of chafing fuel heating mendations and reiterated a safety rec- including the importance of havingcanisters further increases the risk of ommendation to the U.S. Coast Guard: at least one marine crewmember onfire. In this incident, the cause of the boardavesselwithnon-crewper- fire was an improperly extinguished 1. City Cruises U.S., operator of thesonnel, having procedures for prop- chafingfuelheatingcanisterthat M/V Spirit of Boston, require at leasterlyhandlingopen-flamedevices,wasunintentionallydroppedbya onemarinecrewmemberwhoand implementing SMS. hospitality staff member during dis-isproperlytrainedtorespondtoposal and ignited a plastic glassware shipboardemergencies,includingThe NTSB also reiterated a safety rec- rolling cart. fireto remain on board your ves- ommendation to the Coast Guard:selsuntilallhospitalitystaffand I fopenflamedevicesareusedto othernon-crewpersonneldepartRequirealloperatorsofU.S.-flagkeepfoodandbeverageswarmits the vessel.passenger vessels to implement safetyimportanttohavedocumented managementsystems,takingintoprocedures for how to handle (extin-2. CityCruisesU.S.developproce- accountthecharacteristics,methodsguish and dispose of) such devices to dures for crewmembers and hospi- ofoperation,andnatureofservicemitigate the risk of a fire. tality staff on the proper handlingof these vessels, and, with respect to ofopen-flamedevicesonboardferries, the sizes of the ferry systemsNote:ThePVASafety&Security its vessels.withinwhichthevesselsoperate.Committee discussed the use of chaf-Visual labeled Figure 16 in the NTSB Report on the M/V Spirit of Boston fire shows on the left an X-ray image of debris removed from the Spirit of Boston deck 1 wait station showing chafing fuel heating canister. On the right is a closeup of a chafing fuel heating canister found in the same debris. (Background sources: ATF, Coast Guard) PHOTO: NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD37 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2025'