b'THE INVESTIGATIONThe NTSB was able to recover the vessel and someevidencefromtheoceanfloor.One big question that they could not answer was what caused the fire? NTSB did not reach a conclusionontheinitialsourceofthefire, butitnotedevidencesuggestingthatthe likelycausecouldhavebeentheelectrical distribution system of the vessel, unattended batteries being charged, improperly discarded smoking materials, or another undetermined ignition source.During interviews, previous passengersaboardtheM/VConceptionand otherTruthAquaticsvesselstestifiedthat battery-operatedequipmentincludingdive lights,cameras,underwaterscooters,etc. would be charged inside the salon or the galley each night. Inacaseofunfortunateforeshadowing,a firebrokeoutpreviouslyaboardtheTruth AquaticsvesselM/VVision,becauseofaPhoto source: NTSBbatterychargingissue,butthesmallblaze was quickly extinguished by a passenger.Nodangerous situation. The NTSB investigatorsstandardandwasrequiredtohaveatleast action was taken by the company to address thefoundthatthevesselsownedbyTruthtwoemergencyegresspathwaysfromall potential safety issues highlighted by the nearAquaticsvesselswereregularlyoperatingareas accessible to passengers. The vessel had miss. without a required roving patrol at night andtwomeansofescapefromthebunkroom: The photo at right shows the charging portablewhilepassengerswereintheirbunks.Thespiral stairs forward and an escape hatch aft. electronicsonboardM/VConceptiononNTSB visited other dive boat operations andHowever, both paths led to the salon, which August 31, 2020, two days before the loss offoundoperatorscomplyingwiththerovingwas the location of the fire.In addition, the the vessel.Photo: NTSB watchrequirement.TheNTSBalsoaskedsalon compartment was the only escape path Coast Guard inspectors how they could verifytoexterior(weather)deck.Therefore,theDuring the accident investigation, the NTSBcompliance with the roving patrol requirement,passengersweretrapped,andthecrewwas identifiedseveralareasofconcern.Theseand the Coast Guard stated there was no waynot able to reach them. The NTSB stated if included: to verify compliance without boarding vesselsregulations had required the escape hatch to at night, which is not common practice.exit to a space other than the salon, optimally Lackofsmallpassengervesseldirectlytotheweatherdeck,thepassengers regulations requiring smoke detection inSmallpassengervesselconstructionand crewmember in the bunkroom would have all accommodation spaces. The Subchapterregulations for means of escape. The M/Vlikely been able to escape. T regulations require smoke detectors in theConceptionmetSubchapterTconstruction overnightpassengeraccommodations.The M/VConceptionwasequippedwithtwo modular smoke detectors in the bunkroomone mounted on the overhead of each of the port and starboard aisles. The Conception had no smoke detectors on the main deck in the salon area where crewmembers reported seeing thefire.AlthoughtheConceptionmetthe regulatory compliance for smoke detectors in the passenger bunkroom, the smoke detectors would not have gone off until the fire was well developed and likely uncontrollable.Lack of a roving patrol. All crew members were asleep when the fire started, which is in directcontradictiontoU.S.lawandCoast Guardregulations.VesselscertificatedforHybrid & Zero Emission Solutions overnight operations include an endorsementABB is making sustainable solutions a realityon the Certificate of Inspection mandating afor ferries accross Americas.Learn more at: roving watch to guard against, and give alarmnew.abb.com/marineincaseof,afire,manoverboard,orother NOV 2020 33 SAFETY MATTERS'